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Introduction 
 
In recent years, in the context of the profound social changes associated with the 
enlargement of the EU, a debate has developed involving significant disagreement 
regarding the manner in which individuals evaluate objective inequalities within and 
across national boundaries. The case for a European wide perspective has been set out 
most strongly by Fahey (2007) who argues that a particular sociological approach to 
understanding relative deprivation has led to a narrow understanding of the role and 
significance of reference groups. This distorted perspective, it is argued, has led to a 
neglect of the importance of cross-national disparities and to an undue focus on within 
country differences.  
 
This distortion is considered to be directly connected to the extent to which the 
discussion of poverty and social exclusion in the European Union has been dominated 
by the relative income approach. The conceptual foundations of that approach are 
found in Townsend’s (1979) definition of poverty as ‘exclusion from ordinary living 
patterns, customs and activities due to lack of resources’. As Fahey et al (2005:7-9) 
stresse, Townsend can be seen to have pursued a very different agenda to that 
motivating those coming from the American Soldier tradition.1  He understood the 
term ‘relative deprivation’ in an objective sense and his concern was with the socially 
relative nature of needs and wants rather than with feelings of satisfaction and 
injustice.  
 
For Delhey and Kohler (2006:126) the reference groups to which people orient 
themselves is the litmus test for the appropriateness of an EU-wide perspective on the 
distribution of material deprivation. The crucial requirement that must be fulfilled is 
that citizens’ frames of reference extend beyond the national realm. Whelan and 
Maître (forthcoming) suggest that it is possible to think in terms of weak and strong 
versions of this argument. The former proposes that a common standard relating to an 
acceptable level of participation in one’s own society emerges as a consequence of 
knowledge of conditions in other societies Such effects could be observed while the 
normative framework remained resolutely national; with the obligation for creating 
                                                 
 
1 See Merton and Kitt (1950), Merton (1957). 
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 the conditions in which appropriate participation could take place continuing to be 
seen to reside with the nation state. 2
 
The stronger version of the EU-wide framework requires, as Delhey and Kohler 
(2006: 126) argue, that people perceive themselves as part of larger European or 
stratification system. Furthermore, the perception of being advantaged or 
disadvantaged within this system would have to play an important role in individuals’ 
evaluations of their own life circumstances. The stronger case, as Delhey and Kohler 
(2006: 125) note, is linked to the claim that the concentration on national societies has 
led to a distortion of our perceptions of inequalities that will be corrected as a result of 
Europeanisation and the emergence of European wide distribution conflicts.3 The 
national context is considered to provide an inadequate framework for the analysis of 
social inequalities and it becomes increasingly necessary to enlarge the frame of 
reference by taking into account transnational contexts. From this perspective, norms  
shift from the national to the transnational level, as does the responsibility for meeting 
the associated claims.4
 
The Europeanisation of reference groups is therefore seen to go hand in hand with 
Europeanisation of the economy. However, we should be careful about deducing   the 
former from the latter. Heidenreich and Wunder (2008:25), in their recent analysis of 
patterns of regional inequality in an enlarged Europe, convincingly demonstrate that 
there is no necessary relationship between the geographical level at which inequalities 
are shaped and their consequences for within and between country inequalities. They 
conclude that while supranational regulation of economic, social, regional, and 
employment policies and the integration of the national markets means that the causes 
of social inequalities are increasingly shaped by the EU, such Europeanisation has 
contributed to a situation in which regional inequalities within states in the enlarged 
Europe have increased by 15 per cent over the last eight years, while between-nation 
inequalities in Europe have fallen by 45 per cent. Heidenreich and Wunder (2008:32-
                                                 
 
2 See Ger & Belk (1996) and Keyfitz, (1992).   
3 Each of these positions can in turn be distinguished from one that sees knowledge of external 
circumstances having an impact on aspirations but without implications for current notions of 
entitlement and consequent well-being. 
4 See Beck (2000, 2002)  
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 33) direct attention to the possibility that increasing dissatisfaction with Europe may 
be the consequence of increasing regional and individual inequalities at the national 
level. In similar vein, Kangas and Ritakallio (2007:112) note that, since the structural 
funds are aimed at eradicating regional disparities, they can also have the potential to 
intensify internal comparisons.  Similarly, as Brandolini (2007:80) notes, while an 
EU-wide perspective can be seen as a significant step towards viewing the EU as a 
social entity, it does not necessarily require a strong sense of European identity. Thus, 
Marlier et al (2007:154) suggest that the use of EU-wide social indicators could be 
justified not on the basis of the existence of European wide reference groups but 
precisely as a means of promoting the adoption of such standards within a social 
rights perspective.  
 
An evaluation of the changing nature of European reference groups cannot be 
deduced from a consideration of changes in the geographical level at which 
inequalities are structured or measured but must be the subject of systematic empirical 
investigation. In what follows we seek to take advantage of the recent availability of 
European wide data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) to provide such an analysis. 
 
Fahey’s (2007:41) key argument is that the failure to take into account EU-wide as 
well as national frames of reference people undermines our capacity to understand the 
processes linking material deprivation to subjective reactions. His case rests on 
comparisons of absolute material deprivation levels and how people feel about such 
deprivation. Basing his analysis on the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS), he 
shows that economic clusters within the EU display a similar ranking in terms of 
absolute material deprivation and subjective economic stress and that the least 
favoured income groups in the most prosperous countries exhibit more favourable 
outcomes than the most favoured in the least prosperous countries. However, at no 
point does he seek to explicitly model the relationships between material deprivation 
and individuals’ subjective evaluations of their economic situation. Delhey and 
Kohler (2006:and 2007) using, Euromodule and Eurobarometer data relating to 
satisfaction and ratings of individual, national and EU-wide social and economic 
conditions, do succeed in demonstrating that individuals can evaluate living 
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 conditions in their own and other countries and that the latter are related to their own 
levels of satisfaction. However, Whelan and Maître (forthcoming) conclude that this 
is not sufficient to establish the stronger version of the reference group argument, 
which would require the adoption of a more comprehensive justice evaluation 
methodology involving comparisons of the actual situation with what is considered to 
be just or fair.5 Whelan and Maître (2007 and forthcoming) make use of the EQLS 
and the first wave of EU-SILC covering fourteen countries to argue that the 
predominant frame of reference remains national. 
 
One point on which each of these authors is in agreement is that the data on which the 
arguments to date have been based have been far from ideal in terms of providing 
high quality data an appropriate range of European countries. In this paper we seek to 
take advantage of data from the second wave of EU-SILC covering twenty-six 
countries in order to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the key issues. 
 
Data and Measures 
 
Data 
 
EU-SILC is now the reference source for statistics on income and living conditions, 
and common indicators for social inclusion in the EU. It was launched in 2004 in 13 
Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden) and in Norway and Iceland.  It 
was only in 2005 that the EU-SILC reached its full scale with 25 Member States plus 
Norway and Iceland.  
 
For the purpose of this analysis we use the User Database (UDB) of the EU-SILC 
2005 wave and our analysis is conducted at the household level. The data set covers 
26 countries with Malta not being included. The sample sizes range from 3,622 cases 
in Luxembourg to 22,032 cases in Italy constituting a total sample size of 196,686 
households. We have retained Norway and Iceland in our analysis. However, as 
Brandolini (2007:62) notes, the fact that EU member states are engaged in a process 
                                                 
 
5 For examples of such analyses see Jasso (1999, 2000) 
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 of economic and political unification means that EU wide indices have a significance 
that goes beyond intellectual curiosity. Consequently, in developing indices we 
restrict our attention to the twenty-four Member States with appropriate weighting.   
 
Material Deprivation 
 
In order to address the full range of issues outlined earlier, we require an index of 
material deprivation that is reliable across the range of countries that we include in 
our analysis. The items we have employed are set out in Table 1. These comprise a set 
of five items relating to enforced absence of items such as a car, a PC, a holiday, 
keeping ones home adequately warm and being able to afford a meal with meat, 
chicken every second day. It also includes two items relating to arrears and inability to 
cope with unanticipated expenses. In comparison with the earlier 10-item employed 
by Whelan and Maître (forthcoming) in their analysis of EU-SILC 2004 it excludes 
the enforced absence of a telephone, a colour TV, and a washing machine. Our 
analysis of EU-SILC 2005 suggests that these items are better thought of as forming 
part of a dimension relating to household facilities that also contains item relating to 
household facilities. The inclusion of these items would not contribute to increasing 
the reliability of the scale and would significantly reduce the strength of its 
association with our indicator of subjective economic stress. Given the composition of 
the index, it seems most reasonably described as a measure of ‘consumption 
deprivation’. 
 
The simple 7-item additive scale gives a Cronbach alpha of 0.74 for both the sample 
as a whole and the combined 24 EU countries with appropriate population weighting. 
For the EU countries the coefficient ranges from 0.62 in Denmark and Sweden to 0.74 
in Belgium. The only country where the value falls below 0.60 is Iceland. In 23 of the 
26 cases the coefficient reaches 0.65 or above.  
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 Table 1: Items Used to Measure Consumption Deprivation 
Cannot afford meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian) every second day 
Inability to keep home adequately warm 
Cannot afford to have a car 
Cannot afford a PC 
Cannot afford a weeks holiday away from home 
Cannot afford to pay unexpected required expenses 
Experiencing arrears on rent, mortgage, utility bills or hire purchase payments 
 
We use a version of this measure in which each individual item is weighted by the 
proportion of households possessing that item across the twenty-four EU countries. 
Enforced lack of a widely available item is considered of greater consequence than 
comparable deprivation in the case of an item whose possession is more strongly 
concentrated. Since we have taken EU levels of possession as the reference point, 
deprivation of an item such as a PC will be counted equally across all countries 
included in our analysis. This approach contrasts with that which takes national 
reference points.6 Since our concern is to evaluate the importance of within and 
between country differences, we wish to avoid an approach that necessarily restricts 
deprivation differences across countries. The consumption deprivation measure is 
constructed simply as the sum of the weighted deficits on all 7 items divided by the 
total proportion of items possessed in the EU. Such standardisation produces scores 
ranging from 0 (if an individual lacks no items) to 1 (all items are lacked).  
 
Economic Stress 
 
The measure of subjective economic stress we employ is based on the following 
question asked to the household reference person: 
 
“Thinking now of your household’s total income, from all sources and from all 
household members, would you say that your household is able to make ends meet?” 
 
                                                 
 
6 See Muffels and Fouarge (2004) 
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 Respondents were offered six response categories ranging from “with great difficulty” 
to “very easily”.  The economic stress variable is constructed as being those reporting 
either “great difficulty” or “difficulty”. In the analysis that follows we treat this 
variable as a continuous one with scores ranging from ‘1’ corresponding to “very 
easily” to ‘6’ corresponding to great difficulty. Alternative using an ordered logit 
shows the categories to be fairly equally spaced and produces conclusions that do not 
differ from those arising from OLS regression. 
 
The European Distribution of Material Deprivation and Economic Stress 
 
In Table 2 we show the breakdown of consumption deprivation and subjective 
economic stress. We anticipate that levels of consumption deprivation will vary across 
countries not only in relation to the level of resources available in the society but also 
in relation to degrees of inequality in their distribution. For this reason and to facilitate 
interpretation of the detailed patterns of cross-national findings we have also reported 
the weighted descriptive results relating to variation across, five clusters of country. 
These results have, where appropriate, been weighted to take into account variation in 
population size within the clusters. The five clusters correspond to the conventional 
distinction between welfare regimes and are as follows: 
 
•  The Social Democratic regime which assigns the welfare state a substantial 
redistributive role, seeking to guarantee adequate economic resources 
independently of market or familial reliance. We have included  – Sweden, 
Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway and Netherlands to this cluster. 7 
• The liberal regime acknowledges the primacy of the market and confines the 
state to a residual welfare role, social benefits typically being subject to a 
means test and targeted on those failing in the market.  The UK and Ireland 
constitute this group. 
• The Corporatist regime which involves less emphasis on redistribution and 
views welfare primarily as a mediator of group-based mutual aid and risk 
pooling, with rights to benefits depending on being already inserted in the 
                                                 
 
7 The proper allocation of the Netherlands is matter for debate. We follow Aiginger and Guger (2006) 
and Muffels and Fouarge (2004) in locating it in the social democratic cluster. 
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 labour market. This cluster includes Germany, Austria, Belgium, France and 
Luxembourg. 
• The Southern European regime with family support systems playing a crucial 
role and the benefit system being uneven and minimalist in nature. This group 
comprises Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. 
• The Post Communist group. Juhász (2006) note the difficulties in developing 
an assessment of the types of welfare regimes characterising post-communist 
countries and an evaluation of their adjustment to the European Social Model. 
However, in evaluating the available evidence he directs attention to low 
levels of spending on social protection and to the weakness of social rights.8 
The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia are included in this cluster. 
The pattern of results is largely as we would have expected on the basis of the 
assumption that individuals have reasonably accurate perceptions of their own and 
others economic circumstances, with levels of deprivation and economic stress being 
greatest in the least affluent countries. The correlation between GDP adjusted for 
purchasing power and mean level of deprivation is 0.84 and with mean level of stress 
it is –0.79. Cross-national variation accounts for close to 20 per cent of the variance of 
consumption deprivation. The level of deprivation is lowest in the Social Democratic 
cluster at 0.092 before rising to 0.108 for the liberal regime and to 0.135 for the 
corporatist cluster and to 0.153 for the Southern European group and then more than 
doubling to 0.333 for the post Communist group.  
 
Within the Social Democratic group deprivation ranges from a low of 0.072 in 
Sweden to 0.128 in Finland. Within the Liberal group the Irish and UK are almost 
identical at 0.108 and 0.112. Within the Corporatist group Luxembourg constitutes an 
outlier recording the lowest value of all twenty-six countries of 0.057. The remaining 
countries are located on a continuum running from 0.098 for Austria to 0.140 for 
Germany with Belgium and France being closer to the upper rather than the lower 
end. For the Southern European countries a somewhat wider range of variation is 
                                                 
 
8 For further discussion of pre-accession similarities and differences in the countries included in this 
cluster see Manning  (2004) 
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 observed with Spain and Italy being close to the upper end while for Portugal and 
Cyprus and Greece the observed values go from 0.22 to 0.24. 
Table 2: Mean Levels of Consumption Deprivation and Economic Stress by 
Country 
   
 Consumption Deprivation 
(Standardised score with range 
0-1) 
Economic Stress (range 1-6) 
   
Social Democratic 0.092 2.859 
Sweden 0.072 2.904 
Norway 0.087 2.807 
Netherlands 0.091 2.944 
Denmark 0.096 2.502 
Iceland 0.114 3.229 
Finland 0.128 2.955 
   
Liberal 0.108 3.218 
United Kingdom 0.108 3.194 
Ireland 0.112 3.670 
   
Corporatist 0.135 3.462 
Luxembourg 0.057 2.577 
Austria 0.098 3.181 
Belgium 0.128 3.327 
Germany 0.140 3.415 
France 0.135 3.603 
   
Southern European 0.153 4.061 
Spain 0.134 3.802 
Italy 0.139 4.139 
Cyprus 0.228 4.186 
Portugal 0.219 4.225 
Greece 0.238 4.403 
   
Post Communist 0.333 4.317 
Slovenia 0.153 3.953 
Czech Republic 0.206 3.948 
Èstonia 0.254 3.484 
Hungary 0.304 4.231 
Slovakia 0.328 4.198 
Lithuania 0.377 4.129 
Poland 0.382 4.520 
Latvia 0.431 4.659 
   
EU24 0.160 3.645 
Country Eta2 0.195 0.204 
N 193,586 176.831 
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 As expected, the Post-Communist group display both the highest levels of deprivation 
and also the greatest level of variability. At the lower end of the continuum are 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic with values of 0.153 and 0.206 respectively. The 
remaining six countries exhibit values higher than all other countries with the range of 
values going from 0.254 to 0.431. Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia are at the lower end 
of this spectrum and Lithuania, Poland and Latvia at the higher end. The consumption 
deprivation index thus discriminates between countries and within and between 
welfare regimes in a highly satisfactory manner.  
 
Cross-national variation accounts for 20 per cent of the variance of economic stress. 
The pattern of variation largely mirrors that for consumption deprivation. The level is 
lowest for the Social Democratic cluster at 2.859 before rising to 3.218 and 3.462 
respectively for the Liberal and Corporatist clusters. It then rises significantly to 4.061 
for the Southern European group before peaking at 4.317 for the Post-Communist 
cluster.  
 
Within the Social Democratic group Denmark exhibits the lowest level of stress of 
2.502 followed by Sweden and Norway, Finland and the Netherlands with values 
ranging between 2.807 and 2.955 while Iceland reports the highest levels of stress of 
3.229. Among the liberal countries stress levels are somewhat higher in Ireland than 
in the UK with the respective values being 3.670 and 3.194. Within the corporatist 
group, Luxembourg is once again the exception with a stress value of 2.577. For the 
remaining countries the values range between 3.181 and 3.603 with Germany and 
France being at the upper end of this continuum. All of the Southern European 
Countries report higher levels of stress than the countries considered so far with the 
range running from 3.802 for Spain to 4.403 for Greece. The divide with the post-
Communist group is identical to that for consumption deprivation. However, the 
contrast with the Southern European group is less sharp than in the latter case.  
 
The pattern of results suggests that the consumption deprivation measure not only 
constitutes a highly reliable index but is also a powerful instrument in differentiating 
between countries and clusters of countries in terms of subjective economic stress. 
The results confirm Fahey’s (2007) finding of a close correspondence at this level of 
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 analysis between objective levels of deprivation and their subjective counterparts. 
This is given further confirmation by the fact that a between country regression based 
on mean levels of deprivation and stress shows that almost sixty per cent of the cross-
country variation in economic stress can be accounted for by corresponding variation 
in consumption deprivation. 
 
Fahey’s case for the importance of supra national reference groups was based not just 
on the strength of the association that we have confirmed above but also on the fact 
that, viewed in absolute terms, those at the lower end of the income continuum in 
richer countries experience lower levels of deprivation and stress than those in richer 
countries. In order to address this issue, in Figures 1A and 1B we set out descriptive 
findings for the five welfare regimes that we have identified relating to the breakdown 
of deprivation and stress by national income quintile. The results confirm Fahey’s 
earlier findings.  
 
The mean deprivation level for the bottom quintile in the Social Democratic countries 
is 0.19. This is only marginally higher than that prevailing in top quintile in the Post-
Communist cluster and is lower than that in the fourth quintile of the latter.  While the 
contrast between clusters are not as sharp as in Fahey’s analysis, which included 
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, the conclusion still holds that the position of the most 
favoured in the least affluent cluster is not significantly different from that of the least 
favoured in the most affluent cluster. 
 
The mean level of economic stress for the bottom quintile in the Social Democratic 
countries is 3.50 this is equal to the observed level for the top quintile in the Post 
Communist countries and is only marginally higher than the level for the top quintile 
in the Southern European countries. Similarly, those in the bottom quintile in the 
Liberal countries exhibit lower levels of stress than those in the fourth quintile in the 
Southern European and Post-Communist countries. Those in the bottom quintile of 
the corporatist cluster look similar to those in the third quintile of the two least 
favoured clusters. 
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 Figure 1A: Mean Consumption Deprivation By Quintile by Welfare Regime 
igure 1B: Mean Level of Economic Stress By Quintile by Welfare Regime 
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sing the substantially superior database provided by EU-SILC, we have confirmed U
the two key findings on which Fahey based his conclusion relating to the 
Europeanisation of reference groups. The reminder of this paper is concerned with 
explaining why, despite the agreement of our analysis with Fahey’s on these points, 
we remain unconvinced by his substantive conclusions. 
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 Analysing the Relationship between Consumption Deprivation and Economic 
Stress 
 
In pursuing a systematic analysis of the relationship between material deprivation and 
economic stress across a wide range of countries, we are confronted with the 
challenge of interpreting both within and between country effects and deciding 
whether or not they are tapping the same underlying processes. However, as Snijders 
and Bosker (1999:26) note, within group relationships can, in principle, derive from 
completely different principles to those underlying between group associations. Taken 
at face value the strong association between consumption deprivation and economic 
stress at national level is striking. However, the difficulties associated with the 
interpretation of such between country relationships are complicated by problems 
associated with both multicollinearity and the small number of observations. The 
countries in our analysis differ in many other respects than current levels of 
consumption deprivation leading to the danger of spurious correlation at across 
national level between these outcomes. A range of within country processes with the 
potential to affect both economic performance and the manner in which it is evaluated 
could account for the association between deprivation and stress at the national level.9  
 
Table 3: Regression of Economic Stress by Consumption Deprivation and 
Country 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Constant 
(NL) 
3.034  2.639  2.425 .011 
LU   -.253 .019 -.155 .021 
NO   -.124 .016 -.044 .019 
SE   .023 .016 .134 .018 
IS   .206 .020 .261 .025 
DK   -.462 .016 -.366 .018 
FI   -.113 .013 .049 .016 
AT   .208 .017 .359 .019 
BE   .256 .016 .383 .019 
DE   .302 .012 .500 .015 
FR   .510 .014 .725 .016 
UK   .191 .016 .345 .016 
                                                 
 
9 For a discussion of similar difficulties relating to associations involving GDP see Frey and Stuzer 
(2002) and Inglehart and Klingeman (2000). 
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 IE   .654 .013 .834 .018 
ES   .711 .012 .813 .016 
IT   1.031 .012 1.244 .014 
CY   .779 .018 1.019 .025 
PT   .846 .017 1.088 .023 
GR   .962 .016 1.235 .021 
SI   .797 .014 1.006 .018 
CZ   .614 .017 .879 .022 
EE   -.011 .018 .405 .025 
HU   .568 .015 1.004 .021 
PL   .596 .013 1.017 .017 
LT   .219 .018 .753 .027 
LV   .566 .019 1.108 .030 
SK   .453 .017 1.045 .025 
CD 3.599 0.010 3.370 .011 5.723 0.065 
LU*CD     -.320 .142 
NO*CD     -.807 .105 
SE*CD     -.933 .112 
IS*CD     -.961 .132 
DK*CD     -1.125 0.082 
FI*CD     -1.952 0.102 
AT*CD     -1.705 .106 
BE*CD     -1.678 .092 
DE*CD     -2.242 .077 
FR*CD     -2.361 .082 
UK*CD     -1.810 .085 
IE*CD     -2.058 .091 
ES*CD     -1.525 .081 
IT*CD     -2.347 .072 
CY*CD     -2.468 .097 
PT*CD     -2.481 .093 
GR*CD     -2.606 .084 
SI*CD     -2.325 .086 
CZ*CD     -2.604 .089 
EE*CD     -3.150 .091 
HU*CD     -3.087 .079 
PL*CD     -2.898 .070 
LT*CD     -3.203 .085 
LV*CD     -3.116 .085 
SK*CD     -3.504 .085 
       
R2 0.385  0.475  0.489  
N 193,374  193.374   193,374 
 
Determining whether between country level associations support the argument for 
national references groups is made extremely difficult because of the possibility of 
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 such spurious correlation arising from such in observed heterogeneity. We have opted 
not to employ a random effects model because we are interested in specific country 
effects and do not wish to consider our twenty-six observations as random selected 
from a wider population.10 It is not possible to validate the strong version of the 
Europeanisation of reference groups, on this basis of between country correlations. 
The weaker version which implies simply that notions of appropriate national 
thresholds, and of what constitutes an acceptable level of participation in one’s own 
society, come to be influenced by knowledge of conditions in other societies suggests 
that the within country impact of consumption deprivation on subjective economic 
stress should be relatively uniform across countries. It is difficult to see that the strong 
version of the European reference group hypothesis can be validated in the absence of 
support for the weaker version. Without evidence that notions of what constitutes an 
unacceptable level of consumption deprivation have become relatively uniform across 
countries, it becomes hard to see that the strong version which requires a shift in 
norms and aspirations from national to a transnational level and the increasing 
salience of European wide distribution conflicts can be sustained. 
 
The weak versions can be tested by a focus on variation across countries in the impact 
of consumption deprivation on economic stress. In Table 3 we set out the analysis 
appropriate to addressing this issue. In equation  (i) we estimate the simple ordinary 
least squares equation relating to the impact of consumption deprivation on economic 
stress. This estimate combines information on both within and between country 
variation but makes no adjustment for the multi-level structure of the data in which 
individuals are clustered within countries. This provides an estimate of 3.599 for the 
deprivation coefficient and accounts for 0.385 of the variance. In equation (ii) we 
enter the country dummies and obtain a fixed effects estimate of the impact of 
consumption deprivation on economic stress that is based solely on within country 
variation. The estimate of the deprivation effect falls to 3.370 while the R2 increases to 
0.475. The assumption underlying equation (ii) is that implicit in the weaker version 
                                                 
 
10In any event. as Snijders and Bosker (1999:44 ) note, with a mall number of second level units and 
large sample sizes within clusters the difference between analysis of covariance and random intercept 
models will be negligible. For a general discussion of the conditions under which random effects 
models are appropriate and the need to compare fixed effect and random effect outcomes see Halaby 
(2004). 
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 of the European reference groups hypothesis, that the effect of an increase involving 
an identical absolute increase in deprivation within nations is uniform across 
countries. In equation (iii) we provide an explicit test of this hypothesis by 
considering the manner in which consumption deprivation interacts with country. This 
produces a significant increase in the R2 to 0.489. A clear pattern of interaction 
emerges across countries and welfare regime broadly consistent with the 
interpretation that the impact of consumption deprivation increases as one moves from 
the least to the most affluent countries/regimes.   
 
The magnitude of the deprivation coefficient ranges from a high of 5.723 for The 
Netherlands to a low of 2.219 in Slovakia. To facilitate our description of country 
variation in Table 4 we show the regression analysis corresponding to (iii) above for 
welfare regimes. On this occasion we have not weighted to take population size into 
account. Instead we operate with the simplifying assumption that the underlying 
process relating deprivation to stress is uniform within welfare regimes in which case 
sample size will have no impact on the outcome. In the case of the corporatist regime 
we have excluded Luxembourg from the analysis because it constitutes such an outlier 
that its inclusion would obscure an important substantive finding.  
 
In this instance, as we can see from equation (i), deprivation on its own accounts for 
0.383 of the variance. Adding the cluster effects as in the fixed effects model in 
equation (ii) increases the level of explanation to 0.427. Entering the interactions 
between deprivation and welfare regime increases the level of variance explanation to 
0.462. The pattern of interaction reveals the declining impact of deprivation as one 
moves from the Social Democratic regime to the Post-Communist cluster with the 
relevant interaction coefficient declining gradually from –0.761 to –0.961 to –1.130 to 
–1.831. The implication of the findings set out in equation (iii) is that differences 
between welfare regimes in their levels of economic stress are conditional on 
specifying level of consumption deprivation. From equation (iii) we can see that in a 
model that incorporates such interactions significant differences in stress levels are 
observed between welfare regimes at zero levels of deprivation.  
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Table 4: Regression of Economic Stress by Consumption Deprivation and 
Welfare Regime* 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Constant 
(Social 
Democratic) 
 
3.053 
  
2.545 
  
2.419 
 
Liberal   .465 .009 .537 .011 
Corporatist   .441 .007 .529 .009 
Southern 
European 
  1.003 .007 1.108 .008 
Post 
Communist 
  .637 .007 .941 .009 
Consumption 
Deprivation 
(CD) 
3.558  3.326  4.583 .030 
Liberal*CD     -.761 .052 
Corporatist*CD     -.961 .041 
Southern 
European*CD 
    -1.130 .037 
Post 
Communist*CD 
    -1.831 .034 
R2 0.383  0.427  0.462  
N 189,816  189,816  189,816  
*Excluding Luxembourg
 
In order to illustrate the degree of systematic variation in the impact of consumption 
deprivation across country and welfare regime, in Figure 2 we set out the value of the 
deprivation effect for all 26 countries and 5 welfare regimes. 11 At the level of welfare 
regime the largest deprivation coefficient of 4.583 is associated with the Social 
Democratic cluster. Within this group the coefficient ranges from 5.723 for the 
Netherlands to 3.798 for Finland which constitutes something of an outlier. Sweden, 
Norway, Iceland and Denmark are located in the narrow range running from 4.916 to 
4.588. For the Liberal regime the average value falls to 3.822 with the impact being 
slightly higher in the UK than in Ireland. A further drop to 3.622 is observed for the 
Corporatist group. The observations in this group are located in the range running 
from 4.018 to 3.362 with Austria and Belgium being at the higher end of the 
continuum and Germany and France at the lower end. The value of the deprivation 
                                                 
 
11 In the latter case Luxembourg is once again excluded. 
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 coefficient for the Southern European countries declines to 3.453. The highest value 
by some distance is of 4.198 is observed for Spain. It is followed by Italy with a value 
of 3.378. However, these are the only cases in which there is an overlap with the 
earlier clusters. For the remaining countries the range runs from 3.255 for Cyprus to 
3.119 for Greece. Finally, the lowest average value of 2.753 is observed for the Post 
Communist cluster. The highest values ranging of 3.398 to 3.119 are observed for 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic. The remaining observations range between 2.824 to 
2.219 with Poland, Estonia and Hungary at the upper end of the continuum and 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia at the lower end. 
 
Since our data is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal we cannot rule out the 
possibility that, despite the striking cross-national differences that we have observed, 
some convergence has occurred over time. However, if it was the case then it was 
necessarily from a starting point involving very substantial heterogeneity and has 
some considerable distance to go before one could speak of relative uniformity of 
reference groups. 
Figure 2: Deprivation Coefficient by Country and by Welfare Regime 
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 The pattern of variation related to the impact of consumption deprivation on 
subjective stress suggests that it is associated with corresponding cross-national 
variation in objective living economic circumstances. Taking our measure of 
consumption deprivation as a proxy for such circumstances, in Figure 3 we plot the 
relationship between national deprivation levels and the magnitude of the deprivation 
coefficient produced. A linear specification produces a correlation of 0.822 
accounting for 0.663 of the variance. However, a significant improvement is achieved 
by specifying a natural log form for deprivation which increases the correlation 
coefficient to 0.896 accounting for 0.803 of the variance. The impact of consumption 
deprivation declines as the average level of deprivation in the society increases. 
However, this decline takes a proportionate rather than an absolute form.  
 
It remains possible that the observed association is accounted for by a third factor 
correlated with both consumption deprivation and economic stress. The log 
specification for GDP is rather marginally less successful in accounting for variation 
in the impact of deprivation in producing an R2 of 0.711while the log of mean income 
produces an R2 of 0.662. One further source of information relating to the importance 
of mean level of deprivation versus other closely correlated dimensions such as GDP 
and average income levels can be derived from varying the order of entry. In both 
cases entering GDP or income after consumption deprivation produces a negligible 
increase in the reduction of the variance explained. Reversing this order of entry so 
that deprivation is entered second produces an increase from 0.711 to 0.804 in the 
case of GDP and from 0.622 to 0.803 in the case of income. Those factors associated 
with GDP and income that are not mediated by consumption deprivation have no 
impact on the strength of the relationship between consumption deprivation and 
economic stress. This makes it less likely that the observed relationship is spurious.  
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 Figure 3: Magnitude of Deprivation by Mean Level of Deprivation by Country 
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It is clear that the substantial differences in levels of economic stress that are observed 
between countries at low levels of deprivation narrow as mean deprivation increases. 
In Figure 4 we illustrate how cross-national differences vary as the level of 
deprivation changes. We have done this for five countries comprising one from each 
welfare regime namely Sweden, the UK, Germany, Greece and Poland. We have 
restricted our comparison to the range of deprivation running from 0 to 0.45 because 
beyond this point the numbers found in the more affluent countries become very 
small. Both the risk level associated with deprivation and the distribution of 
individuals across the deprivation continuum contribute to differences in mean levels 
of economic stress between countries. While Greece displays higher levels of 
economic stress than Poland at every point on the deprivation continuum, the mean 
stress level is higher in the latter. This arises from the fact that the Polish households 
are more concentrated at the upper end of the deprivation continuum. 
 
From Figure 4 we can see that at zero level of deprivation Sweden enjoys an 
advantage in terms of economic stress over the four remaining countries. Factors other 
than current cross-national variation in levels of consumption deprivation clearly play 
a substantial role in producing such differences. Obvious candidates would include 
comparisons with earlier standards and expectations relating to future economic 
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 prospects both personal and national. In the case of Greece the gap at zero level of 
deprivation amounts to1.10. This falls to 0.88 for Poland to 0.36 for Germany and to 
0.21 for the UK. When deprivation rises to 0.20 the corresponding figures are 0.13 
and 0.10, 0.76 and 0.49. At a level of deprivation of 0.45, below which it must be kept 
in mind that 98 per cent of Swedish households are located, Swedish stress levels are 
actually slightly higher than those prevailing in the UK and Germany and identical to 
those in Poland. The process of convergence applies, with varying strength, to each of 
the two-way comparisons with the exception of Greece-Poland where, since the 
starting point for the former involves a higher level of deprivation than the latter, we 
observe a process of modest divergence.12  
 
Figure 4: An Illustration of Converging Economic Stress Levels with Increasing 
Consumption Deprivation for a Selected Set of Countries 
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Conclusions 
 
Taking advantage of the substantial improvement in the quality of data provided by 
the availability of EU-SILC, we have confirmed two findings that have been key to 
the claims put forward by advocates of the Europeanisation of reference groups thesis. 
The first concerns a close association at the national level between material 
deprivation and subjective economic stress. The second involves the confirmation that 
individuals at the bottom of the household income hierarchy in more affluent 
                                                 
 
12 Similar differences emerge when we focus on welfare regimes. 
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 countries experience lower levels of deprivation and economic stress than those in the 
upper levels of the income distribution in the least prosperous countries. However, 
these descriptive findings are not sufficient to establish a causal relationship between 
deprivation and stress at the national level.  
 
The possibility clearly exists that the observed association may be a consequence of a 
joint association with other variables and that the processes underlying the between 
country association between consumption deprivation and economic stress are quite 
different to those influencing within country variation. In relation to the weaker 
version of the Europeanisation of reference groups hypothesis, an explicit test is 
possible focusing on within country variation. It suggests that a given increase in 
consumption deprivation, benchmarked in overall EU terms, should have a uniform 
impact on level of economic stress across countries or should be converging towards 
such an outcome. Our analysis shows that this is clearly not the case. Context matters 
and systematic variation is observed across countries with the impact of a particular 
increase in deprivation being substantially greater in countries where deprivation is 
less common. The impact of consumption deprivation on economic stress declines 
progressively as the national level of deprivation increases but in a proportionate 
rather than an absolute fashion. If a process of convergence is under way it is one that 
must have started from a point of quite striking cross-country differentials and is one 
that has along way to go before it could be considered to involve a substantively 
important form of Europeanisation of reference groups. 
 
The consequence of such variation is that differences in economic stress between 
countries and regimes are greater for households at the lower rather than the higher 
end of the deprivation continuum.13 The evidence thus points decisively in the 
direction of a rejection of the weaker version of the Europeanisation of reference 
group hypothesis. It is difficult therefore to see what formulation of the underlying 
processes could sustain the stronger version relating to a shift in normative reference 
point from the national to the transnational level. 
                                                 
 
13 This finding is consistent with the conclusion reached by Whelan and Maître (2007) based on an 
analysis of the EQLS data and with Boehnke’s (2008) and Whelan and Maître (2005) conclusions 
using the same data set that adverse conditions are more likely to give rise to marginalisation  where 
deprivation is least common. 
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The evidence we have presented provides further support for the conclusion of 
Marlier et al (2007-154-155) that a EU-wide approach by failing to take into account 
differences in “the significance of goods in social functioning” would miss people in 
richer countries who are experiencing genuine exclusion from their own society while 
counting substantial numbers in the poorer societies who are not experiencing such 
exclusion.  
 
 Heidenreich and Wunder (2008) note that, while the causes of social inequality are 
increasingly shaped at the EU level, this arises through supranational regulation of 
economic, social, regional, and employment policies and the integration of the 
national markets rather than through European welfare state processes comparable to 
national arrangements or, as Diamond (2006:181) expresses it, through negative 
integration rather than positive social integration. In a similar fashion Ferrera (2006: 
258-9) notes that European integration is based on a logic of economic opening that 
challenges the spatial demarcations and closure practices that sustain national 
solidarity.14 In this context Alber et al (2008:6-7) point to a range of evidence 
suggesting that in, contrast with European elites, ordinary European hesitate to extend 
notions of solidarity beyond the boundaries of the nation state.  
 
Heidenreich and Wunder (2008) conclude that if norms of solidarity refer primarily to 
a national community, then the pursuit of the European integration process may not be 
possible without new transnational concepts of solidarity, equality, and justice.15 
Ferrera (2006:274), on the other hand, suggests that it may be necessary to recast the 
European integration project so that it can be promoted as the best means of 
safeguarding modernized national social protection systems.16 The challenge is to 
achieve an appropriate combination of national and transnational forms of legitimacy. 
                                                 
 
14 For a detailed discussion of the influence of different spheres of EU policy on institutional and 
substantive social policy outcomes and their impact relative to that of international organisations such 
as the IMF and the World Bank see Guillén and Palier (2004) 
15 In this context Alber et al (2007) point to arrange of evidence that, in contrast with European elites, 
ordinary Europeans hesitate to extend notions of solidarity beyond the boundaries of the nation state. 
16 For a more general discussion of the relationship between Europeanisation, the welfare state and 
issues relating to national identity and self-image see Cuperus (2006) 
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 In this context, it is necessary to accept that there is no simple relationship between 
the Europeanisation of inequality and the Europeanisation of reference groups.  
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